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PROPERTY RULES, LIABILITY RULES, AND
ADVERSE POSSESSION
Thomas W. Merrill*
INTRODUCTION

The law of adverse possession tends to be regarded as a quiet backwater. Both judicial opinions and leading treatises treat the legal doctrine as settled. The theory underlying the doctrine, although routinely
discussed in the opening weeks of first-year property courses, is only
rarely aired in the law reviews any more. Indeed, the most frequently
cited articles on adverse possession date from the 1930s and earlier.1 Perhaps most tellingly, adverse possession seems to have completely escaped
a
the attention of the modem law and economics movement-almost
2
sure sign of obscurity in today's legal-academic world.
Nevertheless, two recent events--one academic, the other judicialare sufficiently challenging to our conventional understanding of adverse
possession that they deserve comment. The academic event is the publication of a law review article by Professor Richard Helmholz of the University of Chicago concerning the state of mind that a possessor must
have before he can obtain title by adverse possession. 3 Earlier treatments
of this subject tended to proceed normatively, asserting the "correct"
rule based on considerations of policy. 4 Helmholz, however, is interested
* Associate Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law; B.A. Grinnell College
(1971); B.A., Oxford University (1973); J.D., University of Chicago (1974). The author would like
to thank Richard Helmholz, Victor Goldberg, and Carol Rose for reading and commenting on an
earlier draft.
1 Eg., Ballantine, Claim of Title in Adverse Possession, 28 YALE L.J. 219 (1918); Ballantine,
Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REv. 135 (1918) [hereinafter cited as Ballantine, Title];
Bordwell, Mistake and Adverse Possession, 7 IOWA L. BULL. 129 (1922); Sternberg, The Element of
Hostility in Adverse Possession, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 207 (1932); Taylor, Titles to Land by Adverse Possession, 20 IOWA L. REV. 551 (1935); Taylor, Actual Possession in Adverse Possession ofLand, 25 IOWA
L. REV. 78 (1939); Walsh, Title By Adverse Possession, 16 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 532 and 17 N.Y.U.
L.Q. REV. 44 (1939).
2 There is a considerable economic literature on the evolution of private property rights, see,
e.g., Demsetz, Toward a Theory of PropertyRights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347 (Papers & Proceedings
1967); Anderson & Hill, The Evolution of PropertyRights. A Study ofthe American West, 18 J. LAW
& ECON. 163 (1975), but none that I am aware of on the operation of the legal doctrine of adverse
possession as it applies in the mature Anglo-American common law system. For instance, there are
no index entries to adverse possession or prescription in R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSiS OF LAW
(2d ed. 1977).
3 Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 331 (1983).
4 See, eg., the articles by Ballantine, Sternberg, and Walsh, supra note 1.
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in determining what state of mind is actually demanded by courts before

they will award title by adverse possession. To this end, he has surveyed
"the bulk" of all reported cases dealing with adverse possession decided

since 1966. 5 His conclusion is rather startling. Although academic commentators generally argue that the subjective mental state of the possessor should be irrelevant, Helmholz finds that "where courts allow

adverse possession to ripen into title, bad faith on the part of the possessor seldom exists. Where the possessor knows that he is trespassing,
' 6

valid title does not accrue to him simply by the passage of years.
If nothing else, Helmholz' study casts doubt on whether we should
take the common law test for acquiring title by adverse possession at face
value. According to the common law, adverse possession requires, in
addition to the running of the statute of limitations, that the possession
be (1) actual, (2) open and notorious, (3) exclusive, (4) continuous, and

(5) hostile under a claim of right.7 The common law test does not demand subjective good faith belief on the part of the possessor that he is
entitled to the property.8 Nevertheless, it appears that judges and juries
rather consistently manipulate the five standard elements in such a way

as to award title to the possessor who entered the property in good faith,
i.e., without actual knowledge of the paramount title of the true owner,
and to deny title to the possessor who entered in bad faith, i.e., with

actual knowledge of the paramount title. Subjective good faith is, then,
an unstated sixth element--one which can be overcome perhaps if the
5 Helmholz, supranote 3, at 333. In a footnote, Professor Helmholz reports that he "examined
about 850 appellate opinions" in preparing his study. Id. at 333 n.7.
6 Id. at 347.
7 Id. at 334; see also R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 758 (1984).
8 The requirement that the possessor have a "claim of right" is sometimes construed to mean a
subjective good faith belief that he is entitled to the property (see, eg., Jasperson v. Scharnikow, 150
F. 571 (9th Cir. 1907)) but the interpretation of "claim of right" favored by most courts and commentators is that the possessor must claim the property on some basis other than the permission of
the title owner, i.e., the possessor may not be a tenant or licensee of the title owner. See, eg., C.
DONAHUE, T. KAuPER, & P. MARTIN, PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTION To THE CONCEPT AND

THE INSTrUTION 137 (2d ed. 1983) ("By and large, most American courts today require neither
that the adverse possessor have a subjective hostile intent nor that he be in good faith."); see also
Helmholz, supra note 3, at 334 n.10.
Notwithstanding this "preferred" interpretation of claim of right, a number of states require
that the possessor's subjective state of mind be taken into account in some way. For example, New
Mexico requires good faith, color of title, and payment of taxes as a condition to obtaining title by
adverse possession, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-22 (1978); Arkansas requires color of title and payment
of taxes, ARK. STAT. ANN. §37-102 (1962); and Georgia requires that the possession "not have
originated in fraud," GA. CODE ANN., § 85-402 (1978). In other states, the statute of limitations is
shortened by the presence of one or more of these elements. Illinois, South Dakota, and Washington
decrease the period where there is good faith, color of title, and payment of taxes, ILI. ANN. STAT.
§83-6 (Smith-Hurd 1966); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §15-3-15 (1967); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. ch.
7.28.070 (1961); Alaska, Arizona, and Michigan where there is color of title, ALAsKA STAT. §12523; MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5801 (West 1968); and Louisiana where there is good faith,
LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 3475 (West 1953).
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equities strongly cut the other way,9 but a presumptive element all the
same. This conclusion, which Helmholz convincingly demonstrates, suggests the need to reassess the common law doctrine.
The judicial event which challenges our traditional understanding of
adverse possession is a decision of the California Supreme Court, Warsaw
v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Ina,10 concerning a first cousin of adverse
possession-prescriptive easements." The plaintiff had constructed a
large commercial building with a narrow driveway that left insufficient
room for delivery trucks to turn around and back up to its loading dock.
Consequently, trucks regularly drove onto a vacant portion of the defendant's land next door in order to make this maneuver. The plaintiff
was aware of the problem, and tried several times, without success, to
purchase an easement from the defendant. Later, the defendant decided
to develop its land, erecting a pad of earth (and, after the plaintiff was
denied a preliminary injunction, a warehouse) at the point where the
trucks turned onto its property. The plaintiff sued, contending that the
construction interfered with an easement it had acquired by prescription.
The trial court sustained this contention, finding that the plaintiff had
used the subject property for the statutory period of five years, and had
satisfied all of the other elements necessary for prescription. The defendant was ordered to remove the pad of earth and the structure.
What is signficant about Warsaw is the debate about remedies which
took place on appeal. The court of appeal, although sustaining the finding that the plaintiff had satisfied the requirements for prescription, declared that the plaintiff could obtain a prescriptive easement and force
the defendant to remove the improvements, only if the plaintiffagreed to
12
pay the defendant the fair market value of the easement thus acquired.
The California Supreme Court likewise upheld the finding that the plaintiff had satisfied the requirements for prescription, but overturned this
novel form of relief.13
9 Helmholz notes several reported cases in which the bad faith possessor was awarded title, but
observes: "Many involved the conjunction of four 'equitable' factors: a sympathy-inducing possessor,
an unsympathetic record owner who had knowingly slept on his rights, the passage of a considerable
period of time, and improvements made on the land by the hostile possessor." Helmholz, supra note
3, at 347-48.
10 35 Cal. 3d 564, 676 P.2d 584, 199 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1984).
11 Prescriptive easements involve nonpossessory use of property which ripens into an easement,
as opposed to possession of property which ripens into a fee simple. 7 R. PowELL, REAL PROPERTY
1026 (P. Rohan ed. 1977). Generally speaking, the same legal requirements apply to both adverse
possession and prescriptive easements, although the non-possessory nature of an easement generally
means that the continuity and exclusivity elements must be interpreted differently. See C. DONAHUE, T. KAUPER & P. MARTIN, supra note 8, at 143.
12 139 Cal. App. 3d 260, 188 Cal. Rptr. 563, 569 (1983) (The full opinion of the court of appeal
appears only in the California Reporter, this Article will therefore cite only to that volume).
13 Four justices thought that the court of appeal's indemnification requirement would interfere
with policies central to adverse possession, and was inconsistent with the California statutes codifying the principle of prescription, which make no mention of payment. 35 Cal. 3d at 573-76, 676 P.2d
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The significance of the debate in Warsaw emerges in terms of the
typology of legal rules introduced by Calabresi and Melamed. 14 Traditionally, adverse possession and prescription have reflected what Calabresi and Melamed call a system of "property rules." That is, before
judgment the true owner's (TO's) interest is protected by a property rule:
no one-including the adverse possessor (AP)-can take it from the TO
without his consent. After entry of judgment awarding the AP title by
adverse possession, the APs interest is protected by a property rule: no
one-including the TO---can take it from the AP without his consent.
The court of appeal's decision in Warsaw, however, suggests a different
kind of scheme. Before judgment, the TO's entitlement would be protected, as before, by a property rule. But after judgment, the entitlement
would remain with the TO, protected now by what Calabresi and Melamed call a "liability rule." In other words, after judgment the TO
would keep the property, but the AP could take it away from the TO
without his consent by paying the TO the fair market value of the property taken.
In what follows, I will suggest that the research of Professor Helmholz and the remedial innovation proposed in Warsaw are related. After
all, Warsaw is, in Professor Helmholz' terminology, a clear case of bad
faith-there is no question that the plaintiff knew that its trucks were
encroaching on land belonging to the defendant. In light of Professor
Helmholz' study, therefore, it is somewhat surprising that the California
courts ruled in favor of the plaintiff in the first place. This may explain
why a majority of the judges who heard the Warsaw case, even if they felt
constrained to hold that the plaintiff had established an easement by prescription, were sympathetic to the idea of making the plaintiff pay for the
easement so acquired-a liability rule. More generally, it suggests that
liability rules may be an appropriate mediating device between the traditional policies supporting the institution of adverse possession-all of
which apply whether the possessor is acting in good faith or in bad
faith-and the evident reluctance of courts to "reward" bad faith possessors by giving the AP an entitlement protected by a property rule.
In Part I, I will consider the theory underlying adverse possession as
an entitlement determination rule. In particular, I will consider what
sort of factors are relevant in deciding who should be awarded the entitleat 591, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 778-80 (Richardson, J., joined by Mosk, Kaus & Broussard, JJ.). Two
justices thought that the relief was fair and equitable and would not interfere with the policies of
adverse possession, but felt constrained by the California statutes to leave such a reform in the hands
of the legislature. 35 Cal. 3d at 576-77, 676 P.2d at 591, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 780 (Grodin, J., joined by
Bird, C.J.). One justice argued that the change was fair, equitable, and consistent with the traditional purposes of adverse possession, and that the courts had sufficient lawmaking powers to impose
a payment requirement consistent with the statutory scheme. 35 Cal. 3d at 577-81, 676 P.2d at 591,

199 Cal. Rptr. at 780-83 (Reynoso, I., dissenting).
14 Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral,85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
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ment to the property both before and after the statute of limitations runs.
In Part II, I will discuss the nature of the rules used to answer this question. I will argue that, from the perspective of a functioning market in
property rights, a mechanical (formalistic) rule would be desirable, but
that the problem of the bad faith possessor introduces a discordant element that pushes us in the direction of a judgmental standard. Finally,
in Part III, I will consider what impact the adoption of a liability rule, as
suggested in Warsaw, would have on the system of adverse possession. If
we required indemnification in all cases of adverse possession, such a reform would rather clearly undermine the rationale for this institution. A
stronger case can be made, however, for requiring indemnification only
in those cases where the TO can show that the AP acted in bad faith.
Making the AP pay for the property in such cases would comport with
our shared sense of the greater moral culpability of the bad faith possessor, and should help deter forced transfers of property. Moreover, adoption of a liability rule in cases of bad faith might allow the ordinary
entitlement determination rules to take on a more mechanical cast, reducing the need for litigation to establish title by adverse possession, and
thereby enhancing the general efficiency of the system of property rights.
I.

THE THEORY OF ADVERSE POSSESSION

According to Calabresi and Melamed, disputes about legal entitlements necessarily entail two subsidiary inquiries: first, to whom should
the entitlement be assigned, and second, what sort of rule should be used
to protect this entitlement-a property rule or a liability rule. 15 In this
section, I will consider how adverse possession operates as a system for
answering the first, or "who," question.
The assignment of entitlements in the period before the statute of
limitations runs need not detain us for long. There is no question about
who gets the entitlement during this period: courts uniformly and automatically award it to the TO. The reasons for this are generally the same
as those which support a system of private property rights, as opposed to
one which recognizes only possessory, i.e., squatter's rights.16 First, there
15 Id. at 1090-93. Calabresi and Melamed also discuss a third possibility which will not be considered here-inalienability rules. Id. at 1111-15. An inalienability rule prohibits the transfer of the
entitlement. Id.
16 The property rights/possessory rights distinction, as I shall use it, is essentially that which
divides the common law actions of ejectment (and the early real actions) from trespass (and the
original assize of novel disseisin). The former protects the interest of one who has title to property,
although he may be out of possession. The latter protects the interest of one who is in possession,
but is not available to the title holder out of possession. A system of possessory rights, in this sense,
is not equivalent to a "state of nature," in which might equals right. In a system of possessory rights,
as I envision it, one who is in possession of property-however that may be defined--could invoke
the power of the state to redress violent or fraudulent dispossession. However, unless one could
claim to have been in possession of property, one would lack any basis for calling upon the power of
the state to redress depredations by others. The primary consequence of a system consisting purely
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is a strong economic justification. If the state did not protect title but
only the fact of possession, no one would ever be secure in leaving valuable things unattended, or entrusting them to someone else through lease
or bailment. 17 The result would undoubtedly be over-investment in security devices, and under-investment in the cultivation and development
of natural resources. In addition, there is a derivative justification based
upon civic values: cultural diversity, countervailing centers of political
power, and independent institutions of scholarly inquiry may require
larger accumulations of private wealth than would be possible under a
system of mere possessory rights.1 8 Finally, and again derivatively, there
is a justification based on human personality: accumulated material

wealth may be important to an individual's identity and plans for the

future, and property rights in material things protect these interests. 19
All of this, with varying degrees of emphasis on different aspects of the
justification for property rights, has rarely been a matter
of controversy,
20

at least within the Anglo-American legal tradition.

The problem comes in determining who should get the entitlement
to the property after the statute of limitations runs. Clearly, courts often
award the entitlement to the possessor rather than to the title holder
during this period-that's what adverse possession is all about. But as

Professor Helmholz' study reminds us, courts may also grant the entitlement to the TO.2 1 Given the strong case for maintaining a system of
property rights, a threshold question is why we are ever justified in shifting the entitlement from the TO to the AP after the passage of a number

of years. Suprisingly, there is very little systematic discussion of this fundamental issue in the legal literature.2 2 Nevertheless, it is possible, with

of possessory rights, in this sense, would be to limit the accumulation of material wealth to that over
which an individual could effectively assert personal dominion.
17 See 2 W. BLACESTON_, CoMsmIARMEs ch. 1 (1766); R. PoSNER, supra note 2, at 27-28;
Demsetz, supra note 2.
18 See M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM ch. 1 (1962); Reich, The New Property, 73
YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
19 Cf Radin, Propertyand Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982) (contrasting property for
personhood and "fetishistic," i.e., purely accumulative, property).
20 Even the Marxist critique of private property advocates state or collectively owned propertynot a system of possessory rights-as an alternative. As Demsetz has pointed out, state or collectively owned property is in many respects more like private property than possessory rights. See
Demsetz, supra note 2. In recent critical legal studies literature one finds some flirtation with the
notion that a "state of nature" (i.e., a society with neither property iior possessory rights) might be
as good or better than a system of property rights. See Kennedy & Michelman, Are Property and
ContractEfficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 711 (1980).
21 Helmholz, supra note 3, at 334-35.
22 To say that the condition of the legal literature is archaic after years of almost complete
neglect is an understatement. The best effort at a systematic restatement of the policies of adverse
possession with which I am familiar is C. CALLAHAN, ADVERSE POSSESSION 79-111 (1961),
although even here the treatment is highly discursive and (in my view) unduly dismissive of certain
points of view. Casebooks often try to compensate for the lack of systemic scholarly discussion by
offering a collection of chestnuts from various legal sources that suggest different rationales for ad-
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some effort, to glean from that literature four different, and yet essentially complementary, rationales for the institution of adverse possession.
The first justification is one that is commonly invoked in support of
23
statutes of limitations generally-the difficulty of proving stale claims.
As time passes, witnesses die, memories fade, and evidence gets lost or
destroyed. The statute of limitations recognizes this problem by adopting a conclusive presumption against attempting to prove claims after a
certain period of time has elapsed.
The concern about lost evidence is common-sensical. As the quality
and quantity of evidentiary material deteriorates over time, the process of
fact-gathering and proof becomes more difficult. Surrogate witnesses and
documents generally are not as accessible or as reliable as originals; consequently, more resources must be expended in finding them and corroborating their veracity. A rule requiring prompt resolution of claims is
thus efficient in that it helps to minimize the costs of litigation and trial.
There is also a fairness concern underlying the lost evidence rationale.
Requiring that disputes be resolved promptly prevents the plaintiff from
unfairly surprising the defendant with a claim that may be difficult or
impossible to refute because evidence that would allow the defendant to
defeat the claim no longer exists.
To be sure, the lost evidence rationale probably carried greater force
in the seventeenth century, when Parliament passed the first general statute limiting the right to recover possession of land,24 than it does today.
In seventeenth-century England there were no recording acts, and
surveys were probably expensive or unreliable, or both. In modern
America, in contrast, all states have acts which provide for permanent
public recordation of deeds to real property and which generally establish the primacy of the recorded deed over unrecorded interests. 25 Furthermore, professional surveys now are widely available at relatively low
cost. Yet even today, lost evidence related to the issue of title can be a
problem. Recorded deeds may contain defects or omissions; the court
house or title plant may burn down; surveying errors may have resulted
in misplaced boundary markers. Moreover, states generally do not maintain a system of public registration or recordation for chattels such as art
work, furniture, and jewelry.2 6 Thus, in the case of personal property,
the lost-evidence rationale applies with as much force today as it did to
real property in the seventeenth century.
verse possession. See, eg., C. HAAR & L. LIEBMAN, PROPERTY AND LAW 55-57 (1977); J.
DUKEMINER & J. KRiER, PROPERTY 82-85 (1981).
23 See, eg., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979); Toussie v. United States, 397
U.S. 112, 114 (1970); C. CALLAHAN, supra note 22.
24 21 Jac., ch. 16 (1623).
25 The Massachusetts Bay Act of 1634 is generally regarded as the first public recording act. See
6A R. POWELL, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 904[1] (1984). For a listing of states by type of recording
act see 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.5 n.63 (Casner ed. 1952).
26 See O'Keefe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980) (no registration of artwork).
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A second concern which has frequently been advanced in the literature on adverse possession is the interest in "quieting titles" to property.2 7 This objective is related to, yet analytically distinct from, the
problem of lost evidence. Imagine a state where lost evidence of title is
never a problem-there is a universal recording system, accurate and indestructable boundary markers, and so forth. Nevertheless, if that state
has no mechanism for eliminating old claims to property, the information costs, transaction costs, and hold out problems involved in discovering and securing the releases of these claims would very likely impose a
significant impediment to the marketability of property. Title examiners
would have to trace every deed back to its source; ancient easements,
unextinguished spousal rights, grants of future interests, unreleased
mortgages or liens could well be discovered; these interests would have to
be traced to present-day successors; and releases of these interests would
then have to be secured. If the buyer always purchased subject to such
claims, no matter how old they might be, he would have to go through a
complicated process of fact-gathering and negotiating in order to obtain
clear title to the property. The "nuisance" value of these claims could
easily lead to holding out or other rent-seeking behavior that would make
the process of obtaining clear title even more burdensome.
Of course, these sorts of impediments exist today with respect to
certain "perpetual" interests like rights of reverter and rights of entry,2 8
and with respect to interests too recent to be extinguished by statutes of
limitations. Buyers have learned to cope with these problems, in part
because of the development of title insurance. Why couldn't title insurance handle the much larger set of claims created by making all competing claims to property perpetual? Perhaps title insurance would become
available to cover this larger set of potentially conflicting claims, but premiums would be much higher than those of today. Thus, whether the
buyer incurred the costs of actually securing releases or paid huge insurance premiums, the net effect would be the same: transactions in property would become more costly. The institution of adverse possession is
designed to reduce this drag on the market by extinguishing most of the
older claims. In the language of takings jurisprudence, adverse posses27 Indeed, the English statute, which limited the right to recover possession of land, expressly
stated that the limitations period was enacted "[flor the quieting of men's estates, and avoiding of
suits." 21 Jac., ch. 16 (1623). See Ballantine, Title, supra note 1, at 135:
The statute has not for its object to reward the diligent trespasser for his wrong nor yet to
penalize the negligent and dormant owner for sleeping on his rights; the great purpose is automatically to quiet all titles which are openly and consistently asserted, to provide proof of meritorious titles, and correct errors in conveyancing.
See also C. CALLAHAN, supra note 22; Sternberg, supra note 1, at 212; Walsh, supra note 1, at 53536.
28 Indeed, because reverters and rights of entry are a perpetual "clog on title," they have frequently been the subject of legislative limitations which have been upheld on the theory that they
improve the marketability of property. See, eg., Trustees of Schools of Township No. I v. Batdorf, 6

Ill. 2d 486, 130 N.E.2d 111 (1955).
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sion rests on a collective judgment that the reduction in information and
transaction costs (or insurance costs) achieved by wiping these older
claims off the books outweighs the "demoralization costs" of eliminating
such remote claims. 29
A third reason commonly advanced in support of a system of ad30
verse possession is that it punishes TO's who "sleep on their rights."
Under this view, the shift in entitlement acts as a penalty to deter TO's
from ignoring their property or otherwise engaging in poor custodial
practices. Since forfeiture is a stiff penalty (frequently deemed unconscionable in other contexts 31) presumably the objective will be realized in
most cases.
At first blush, this rationale seems to rest on a social policy favoring
"active" owners of property, who develop or exploit their land, rather
than "passive" owners. Such a policy seems dubious, because it ignores
the possibility that passive owners, such as land speculators, may perform a valuable social function by preserving the property for use by
future generations. 32 Moreover, the notion that a property owner must
engage in active exploitation or development or risk losing his property
runs counter to the principle that a property owner can do whatever he
33
wants with his property, at least so long as he does not injure others.
Why not then let him ignore the property, if by ignoring it he does not
injure others?
On closer examination, however, these criticisms overstate what is
required of the TO in order to avoid forfeiture. The TO does not have to
develop his land or even occupy it; all he has to do periodically is assert
his right to exclude others. Moreover, there is at least an arguable economic justification for imposing such an affirmative obligation on the
landowner. The passive (and presumably absentee) owner will be harder
to negotiate with, if only because he will be harder to locate. When the
TO is required to assert his right to exclude, therefore, he is in effect
being asked to "flush out" offers to purchase his property, to make a
market in the land.34 On this view, then, the sleeping-owner rationale is
29 See Michelman, Property, Utility, Fairness Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. Rnv. 1165 (1967). Cf Epstein, Not Deference, ButDoctrine: The
Eminent Domain Clause, 1982 Sup. Cr. REv. 351 (recording acts do not constitute a taking because

they afford implicit in-kind compensation in the form of an improved market in property rights).
30 This rationale is said to be more prominent in English than in American law. See J. AMEs,
LECrURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 197 (1913): "English lawyers regard not the merit of the possessor,
but the demerit of the one out of possession."
31 E.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).

32 See Williams, Running Ou" The Problem ofExhaustible Resources, 7 J. LEGAL STuD. 165,
181-85 (1978).
33 This principle is reflected in the traditional maxim of nuisance law, sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedas(no one should use his land so as to injure that of another). See, eg., Fontainebleau Hotel
Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
34 The Supreme Court has indicated that this is a legitimate state objective. Texaco v. Short. 454
U.S. 516, 529 (1982).
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again a justification based on the desirability of encouraging market
transactions in property rights.
A fourth and final explanation for the system of adverse possession
focuses on the possessor, and in particular on the reliance interests that
the possessor may have developed through longstanding possession of the
property. This justification appears in several different forms. One form,
having distinct echoes of a frontier society, invokes the interest in "preserving the peace."' 35 After a sufficient period of time has elapsed, so the
argument goes, the AP's attachment to the property will be so strong
that any attempt by the TO to reassert dominion may lead to violence.
In another form, the reliance argument draws upon the personality theory of property rights, and posits that the AP may have developed an
attachment to the property which is critical to his personal identity. As
Holmes colorfully put it, "[tihe true explanation of title by prescription
seems to me to be that man, like a tree in the cleft of a rock, gradually
shapes his roots to his surroundings, and when the roots have grown to a
'36
certain size, can't be displaced without cutting at his life."
There is also a third, economic version of the reliance theory,
grounded in an ex post analysis of the AP's dilemma. The key concept
here is that of sunk costs or "quasi-rents. ' 37 Suppose the AP has built an
addition to his house which he thinks is on his own land, but which later
turns out to be built on land belonging to the TO. Had the TO and the
AP negotiated for the sale of additional land before the structure was
built, the TO probably would receive no more than market value for the
land, because the AP could always redesign or relocate the addition, or
move elsewhere. Now, however, the TO has the AP over a barrel, and
may be able to extract not only the value of the land but the full value of
the addition as well. In effect, the value of the addition becomes a quasirent from the perspective of the TO. This kind of "extortion" is unfair
because it creates a disproportionate penalty given the initial "wrong" of
the AP (in this case, negligence in failing to procure a survey prior to
construction). It is also inefficient, at least if the prospect of appropriating quasi-rents leads to strategic
bargaining or other rent-seeking con38
duct on the part of the parties.
35 Eg., Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, 35 Cal. 3d at 574, 676 P.2d at 590, 199 Cal. Rptr.

at 779.
36 See R. PERRY,THE THOUGHT AND CHARACTER Op WmInAM JAMES 461-62 (1974). See also

Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv.457, 476-77 (1897).
37 See, e.g., Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration,AppropriableRents, and the Competitive ContractingProcess,21 . LAW & ECON. 297 (1978). See generally TOwARD A THEORY OF
THE RENT-SEEKING SocmiTY (Buchanan, Tollison & Tullock, eds. 1980).
38 The economic version of the reliance theory has at least two problems, however. One difficulty is that it is overbroad, since the problem of appropriation of rents and strategic bargaining will
arise the moment the AP builds his addition. In other words, unlike other rationales for adverse
possession, this view does not explain adequately the significance of the passage of time. Another
difficulty is that the problem of strategic bargaining (and to a large extent the "unfairness" of appro-
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The reliance rationale is troubling, however, at least in any of the
foregoing forms, because it seems to ignore a competing reliance-type
interest: the interest of the TO and of society generally in preserving the
integrity of the set of entitlements grounded in law. Indeed, most modem property theorists, following Bentham, 39 assume that property rights
are the creature of law, not of unilateral expectations inconsistent with
the law. 4° Thus, a policy of transferring entitlements to individuals in
order to protect extra-legal expectations would inevitably undermine the
general security of property rights. Arguably, this generalized interest in
the security of legal entitlements could outweigh-or at least counterbalance-the expectations of the AP which have grown up through longstanding possession of the property.
There is, however, yet another category of reliance interests that
may tip the balance in favor of the institution of adverse possession. So
far, the discussion has focused exclusively on the competing claims of the
AP and the TO. But there may be third parties who also have an interest
in the assignment of entitlement, i.e., vendors, creditors, contractors, tenants, subsequent purchasers of all or part of the property for value. To
be sure, public recording acts are designed in part to protect such persons
from mistaking an AP for a TO. But it simply is not feasible to expect
every interested third party to perform a title search before extending
credit to, providing services for, or purchasing an interest from someone
who appears to be a TO. The appearance of title-particularly the appearance of title consistently maintained for a long period of time-necessarily becomes a rough and ready substitute for an expensive and timeconsuming title search. When we add the expectations of these interested third parties into the mix, there seems to be more than enough
justification to invoke "reliance" as a rationale for the institution of ad41
verse possession.
priating quasi-rents as well) could be solved just as easily by applying a liability rule-allowing the
AP to acquire the property from the TO by paying fair market value--as by shifting the entitlement
to the AP. See generally Part III, infra. Despite these problems, however, it may be that after a
sufficiently long time has passed, the magnitude of the quasi-rents may be so great, and the perception of "unfairness" in requiring the payment of any compensation to the TO so pronounced, that
even a liability rule seems out of place.
39 See J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 111-13 (1914).
40 As the Supreme Court put it in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972): "To have
a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for
it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim
of entitlement to it." The Court went on to explain that "legitimate" claims of entitlement "are
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law." Id.
41 Note that all four rationales for adverse possession really only justify barring the TO's action
for possession. They do not explain why the passage of the statute of limitations should also give rise
to a new title in the AP. The problem of lost evidence, for example, tells us why we do not permit the
TO to sue, but does not account for why the AP should now be rewarded with a legal title to the
property, rather than simply an undisturbed right of possession. Similarly, the quieting title ration-
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In sum, there are four traditional justifications or clusters of justifications which support transferring the entitlement to the AP after the
statute of limitations runs: the problem of lost evidence, the desirability
of quieting titles, the interest in discouraging sleeping owners, and the
reliance interests of AP's and interested third persons. The important
thing to note about these rationales is that, at least at the level of general
justification, they are mutually supportive. 42 One can like some and dislike others, or one can subscribe to all four, and the result is still the
same-the entitlement should be transferred to the AP after the statute

of limitations runs. Indeed, standing alone some of these rationales may
appear too weak to overcome the presumption in favor of a system of
property rights rather than of possessory rights. But taken together, they
represent a rather imposing case for transferring the entitlement to the
AP after a significant period of time has elapsed.

All of this makes Professor Helmholz' study the more puzzling.
The traditional theories suggest that the entitlement should be transferred to the AP after the expiration of the limitations period, and provide no basis for distinguishing between the good faith and bad faith
possessor. Yet Professor Helmholz' findings about the importance of

subjective intent cast considerable doubt on whether the traditional theories provide a complete account of the relevant concerns. Of course, his
findings do not necessarily mean that the proclivities ofjudges and juries
who decide adverse possession cases are correct. One could argue that
judges and juries, absorbed in an ex post analysis of the facts of particular
controversies, simply have failed to appreciate the strength of the sys-

temic justifications for the institution of adverse possession. But it is
probably unwise to denounce the voice of collective experience. A better
approach would be to ask whether the inclination of the courts has some
ale, sleeping owner rationale, and reliance rationale are essentially explanations for cutting off claims
by the TO or preserving the status quo, not for creating a new root of title.
Nevertheless, there is a sound economic reason for giving the AP a new title rather than merely
a right to undisturbed possession. If the TO is forever barred from suing the AP for possession, then
the AP will be forever free to use and consume the property as he likes. Moreover, the AP presumably could sell this right to forever possess and consume the property to API; AP 1 could sell it to
AP 2; and so forth. Since the AP therefore has all the principal incidents of property-the right to
possess, consume, and transfer the thing in question-save formal title, it only makes sense to give
him title as well. Indeed, the principal consequence of refusing to award title to the AP would be to
increase the costs of determining entitlement to the property, requiring AP, API, Ap 2 , etc., to prove
AP's perpetual right to possess, consume, and sell the property. Thus, the reason we give the AP a
new title once the TO is barred from asserting his claim is to eliminate the potential drag on the
market in property rights that would be created by the need to re-try the issue of adverse possession
upon every subsequent sale of the property.
42 This does not mean that the rationales do not have different implications for more specific
issues. Consider, for example, the question whether the statute of limitations should be tolled because of the minority, insanity, or imprisonment of the TO. These sorts of disability provisions make
good sense under the sleeping owner rationale, but no sense from a lost evidence, quieting title, or
reliance perspective.
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justification of its own-a justification which perhaps the legal literature
has overlooked. If such a countervailing rationale exists, then the question of assigning the entitlement after the statute of limitations runs may
not be so simple after all.
Actually, it is not hard to identify a countervailing concern: the
interest in punishing or deterring those who engage in purely coercive
transfers of property. 43 This concern can be stated in terms of incentives.
Purely coercive transfers of property are socially undesirable because
they undermine incentives for productive activity, stimulate excessive
precautionary measures, and generally destroy the fabric of human relations. What then will be the effect on the incidence of this activity if the
dispossessor can, after the passage of a certain period of time, obtain title
to the property? Obtaining title constitutes a powerful reward for such a
coerced transfer. With title, the dispossessor no longer has to fear legal
retribution from the TO (or the state), and can develop, sell, subdivide,
or borrow against the property at will. One would expect a potential
dispossessor, in calculating whether to seize someone else's property, to
balance this potential reward against the probability of apprehension and
the severity of the penalty if caught.44 If we assume any degree of rationality at all (and decisions about taking property are generally "rational,"
i.e., economically motivated) then the potential reward, even if it is several years in coming, should lead to a higher incidence of coerced transfers than we would expect to find in the absence of such a reward.4 5
In the period before the statute of limitations runs, the concern with
punishing or deterring coerced transfers is much in evidence. Intentional
dispossession of property-whether in the form of trespass or theft-generally is regarded as a felony punishable by imprisonment. Moreover,
the TO has an impressive array of civil remedies to recover the property
or its value in money, often fortified by statutory provisions for multiple
43 I have borrowed the phrase "purely coercive transfer" from R. Posner, An Economic Theory
of the Criminal Law (unpublished manuscript). The account set forth below of why it makes sense
to distinguish between good faith and bad faith dispossession closely parallels the explanations given
by Posner and by Calabresi and Melamed for the existence of criminal sanctions: to induce parties
to use market transactions, see R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 121, or to prevent parties from turning
property rules into liability rules, see Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1125. See also
Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime, XXVII NoMos: CRIMINAL JUSTIcE 289, 301-04
(1985) (generalizing the point by arguing that criminal sanctions reinforce the "transaction structure" of society). But see Coleman, Crime, Kickers, and Transaction Structures, in XXVII NoMos,
supra at 313, 323-26 (questioning whether this theory can adequately account for the moral force of

the criminal law).
44 This is the general cost-benefit criterion reflected in the Learned Hand formula and in the
literature on the deterrent effect of the criminal law. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 2, chs. 6, 7;
Becker, Crime and Punishment An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
45 A number of older cases reflect testimony to the effect that the AP entered the property in
hopes of eventually acquiring title by adverse possession. See, eg., Guaranty Title & Trust Corp. v.
United States, 264 U.S. 200 (1924); Jasperson v. Scharnikow, 150 F. 571 (9th Cir. 1907).
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or punitive damages. 46 After the statute runs, however, the concern with

punishing or deterring coerced transfers disappears; or at least it seems to
disappear in the common law doctrine and traditional legal commentary
on adverse possession.
For present purposes, what is especially promising about the interest
in punishing or deterring coerced transfers is that it provides a basis for
distinguishing between the good faith and bad faith possessor, and thus

for explaining the findings of Professor Helmholz. Of course, the concern about dispossession of property applies in some measure whatever
the mental state of the dispossessor. There is an interest in discouraging
people from taking someone else's property, whether they do so intentionally or by mistake. But the interest in discouraging purely coercive

transfers-that is, those in which the dispossessor knows the property is
not his-is clearly stronger than the interest in discouraging innocent
dispossession. This is true whether we view the question in conventional
moral terms-the intentional dispossessor is clearly more culpable or
blameworthy and hence more deserving of punishment than the unwitting dispossessor-or from the vantage point of economic theory.4 7

In economic terms, the intentional dispossessor is distinguishable
from the inadvertent or negligent dispossessor because he has more

clearly turned his back on consensual (i.e., market) mechanisms for the
transfer of property rights.4a To be sure, in nearly all adverse possession

cases the structure of relationships suggests a low transaction cost setting. The number of parties involved and the costs of drafting and en-

forcing a contract should be low in virtually every case, and should not
vary with the subjective mental state of the possessor. 49 But the information costs involved in identifying the affected parties and the scope of the
affected property rights are clearly lower in the case of intentional dispossession than in a case of negligent dispossession. By definition, the inten-

tional dispossessor knows that he is dealing with property that belongs to
46 See Annot., 111 A.L.R. 79 (1937).
47 As Helmholz notes, the good faith/bad faith distinction was expressly recognized in the Roman law of prescription and remains a requirement in civil law systems. Helmholtz, supranote 3, at
356. Even in common law jurisdictions, it is an important factor in areas of the law loosely associated with adverse possession such as accession and confusion. See J. DUKEMINIER & J. KR ER,
supra note 22, at 80-82. Perhaps most significantly for present purposes, courts often condition an
award of injunctive relief to a TO against encroaching structures or improvements (as opposed to
limiting the TO to an award of damages) on a finding of bad faith on the part of the AP. In fact, this
was one of the issues in Warsaw. See Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, 35 Cal. 3d at 576, 676
P.2d at 591, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 779-80 (1984) (upholding an injunction to the plaintiff against the
encroaching warehouse-the plaintiff having been found to be the owner of a prescriptive easement-because the defendant acted "with prior notice of the plaintiffs' claim," i.e., in bad faith).
48 See RL POSNER, supra note 2, at 121. It may also be that the intentional dispossessor is a more
dangerous person, i.e., more likely to engage in such depredations again.
49 For an analysis of transaction costs in terms of these sorts of structural features, see Merrill,
Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 1. LEGAL STUD. 13, 21-22
(1985).
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someone else. Thus, the intentional dispossessor has less excuse for disregarding the possibility of consensual exchange than does the unintentional dispossessor. 50
Given this distinction between intentional and unintentional dispossession, it is possible to rationalize Professor Helmholz' findings as follows. In the case of the good faith AP, courts have implicitly balanced
the interest in punishing the dispossessor against the systemic justifications for the institution of adverse possession, and have come out in favor
of adverse possession. Apparently the benefits derived from forcing an
innocent or merely negligent AP to forfeit the property-whether these
benefits are expressed in moral terms such as punishing carelessness or
avoiding unjust enrichment, or in economic terms such as encouraging a
high degree of care to avoid dispossession of property-are outweighed
by the costs that such a policy would impose in terms of the underlying
functions of adverse possession. In the case of the bad faith AP, however, courts have engaged in the same implicit balancing and have generally (although not exclusively) come out against adverse possession.
Here, the implicit judgment must be that the benefits derived from forcing a bad faith AP to forfeit the property- again, whether expressed in
moral or economic terms-are sufficiently great that they outweigh the
costs that this policy imposes on the institution of adverse possession.
Introducing the countervailing concern with punishing or deterring
bad faith possession, however, at most explains only the resultsof adverse
possession cases, as revealed by Professor Helmholz' study. This countervailing concern does not account for the curious fact that the leading
opinions, treatise writers, and casebook editors all generally declare that
the subjective state of mind of the AP should be irrelevant. If in fact a
desire to punish or deter the bad faith possessor animates the law of adverse possession, then the failure of the law to acknowledge this fact
50 The blanket distinction between unintentional or good faith possessors on the one hand, and
intentional or bad faith possessors on the other hand, is undoubtedly an over-simplification. For
example, there would seem to be a difference between the AP who knows the property is not his and
knows the identity of the TO (as in Warsaw), and the AP who knows the property is not his but does
not know the identity of the TO. See, eg., Patterson v. Reigle, 4 Pa. 201 (1846). The information
costs will be lower in the former case than in the latter-how much lower would depend on the
specific facts of the case.
On the other side of the ledger, there would seem to be a difference between the AP who is
negligent, in the sense that he has failed to take cost-effective measures to ascertain the identity and
scope of the involved property rights, and the AP who is truly "innocent," in the sense that he has
taken all cost-effective measures to make this determination. See Christensen v. Tucker, 114 Cal.
App. 2d 554, 563, 250 P.2d 660, 668 (1952). Arguably, some kind of sanction is appropriate in the
former case to induce parties to take greater precautions. On the other hand, one could argue that
where the costs of obtaining information about entitlements are sufficiently low relative to the costs
of not proceeding with such information, even the innocent AP should be forced to proceed at his
peril. In this vein, I have previously argued for a right of automatic injunctive relief against even
innocent building encroachments as a way of inducing landholders to obtain the correct information
about boundaries. See Merrill, supra note 49, at 37-38.
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seems utterly perverse. The professed legal standard does not further the
hypothesized objective; on the contrary, it can only result in more intentional dispossession of property than would otherwise exist because it
suggests to the squatter or the thief that he can eventually obtain title by
adverse possession. All of which presents the further inquiry: Why
hasn't the legal doctrine come to recognize the good faith of the AP as
one factor or element to be taken into account in determining the assignment of entitlement? Why in this area are we treated to the odd spectacle of the law doing virtue while it pays homage to vice?
II. ADVERSE PossEsSIoN AS AN ENTITLEMENT
DETERMINATION RULE

Questions about legal entitlements can be analyzed not only in terms
of who gets the entitlement and the choice of remedies to protect those
entitlements, but also along another dimension that cuts across these two
categories, the degree of discretion given to judges and juries in determining the assignment of rights and remedies. Viewed from this perspective,
entitlement determination rules fall on a continuum ranging from highly
mechanical (formalistic) rules at one extreme, to highly judgmental rules
at the other.5 1 Mechanical rules are those that afford very little discretion to judges and juries in establishing substantive and remedial rights.
Since they afford little discretion, they are comparatively inexpensive to
apply-lawyers or even laymen usually can apply them without having
to engage in litigation. Judgmental rules, in contrast, afford broad discretion to judges and juries in determining entitlements. Since they are
broadly discretionary, however, they are unpredictable and hence relatively expensive to apply. When the parties disagree about who is entitled to do what with respect to any particular resource, judgmental rules
increase the probability that the parties will engage in litigation to obtain
a resolution.
Mechanical rules are ideally suited to low transaction cost situations
where voluntary exchange or modification of property rights is commonplace.5 2 Because they are highly predictable and inexpensive to apply,
mechanical rules facilitate such market transactions. Moreover, the arbitrary quality of mechanical rules is of little consequence in these low
transaction cost settings, because
the outcome dictated by the rule can be
53
rearranged by negotiation.
On the other hand, if transaction costs are high or exchange or modification of property rights is otherwise unlikely, then the superiority of
mechanical rules is no longer obvious. Mechanical rules still will be
51 The following discussion draws upon Merrill, supra note 49.
52 This insight is not new. See Pound, The Theory ofJudicialDecision, 36 HARv. L. REv. 940
(1923).
53 The truth of this assertion is conditioned upon the usual assumptions about universal rationality, no wealth effects and so forth. See, ag., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1094-95.
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more predictable and inexpensive to apply, and they may have other advantages, such as deterring certain kinds of socially undesirable behavior.54 But in cases where exchange or modification of rights is
improbable and the socially desirable result is not certain, the application
of a mechanical rule may result in an arbitrary or irrational allocation of
resources. In this sort of situation, judgmental rules, which give judges
and juries greater discretion in deciding allocation questions, may reach
results which are perceived as being more efficient or fairer.
Applying these principles to the system of adverse possession, it is
relatively easy to explain the state of affairs that prevails before the statute of limitations runs. As we have seen, the entitlement is always
awarded to the TO in this situation. Moreover, this conclusion is
reached mechanically-without the exercise of any significant degree of
judicial discretion. Before the statute of limitations expires, the dispute
between AP and TO is governed by the action of ejectment (or trespass)
in the case of real property, and replevin (or detinue or trover) in the case
of personal property.55 Under these actions, the TO only has to show
that the AP is responsible for an unconsented physical occupation of the
TO's property as defined by the ad coelum rule56 (in the case of real
property), or that the AP is responsible for an unconsented asportation
of the TO's property (in the case of personal property). So long as he can
establish the fact of encroachment or asportation without his consent, the
TO has an unqualified right to recover possession of the property or its
value in damages.
Use of mechanical entitlement determination rules makes sense in
this context. Ex ante, there is little reason to think that there will be
significant transaction costs involved in the sorts of situations typically
encountered in adverse possession cases-squatters, misplaced fences,
building encroachments, and the like. As previously suggested, these disputes are likely to involve small numbers of people-typically only one
AP and one TO. Moreover, given the universal practice of publicly recording deeds and the ready availability of professional surveys, the AP
should not find it difficult to ascertain the identity of the TO and to determine where his property ends and that of the TO begins. These sorts of
conditions-small numbers of easily identified parties competing over
easily defined property rights-generally lead to consensual exchange.
Consequently, the use of mechanical entitlement determination rules in
57
this context facilitates the development of a market in property rights.
54 See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685,
1695-96 (1976).
55 See generally C. DONAHUE, T. KAUPER & P. MARTIN, supra note 8, at 60-66, 71-76, 90-96.
56 Cuis est solum eius est usque ad coelum et usque ad inferos (he who owns the soil owns all the
way up to the heavens and all the way down to the depths).
57 A similar analysis applies with respect to personal property, although the costs of identifying
the dispossessor and of identifying the dispossessed property are obviously much greater. Indeed,
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The problem, again, arises in determining the proper sort of rule to
apply after the statute of limitations has expired. Structurally, the situation facing the AP and the TO after the statute of limitations runs is the
same as before. There are probably only a small number of parties involved, the identity of the parties should be relatively easy to ascertain,
and the scope of the affected property rights should be relatively easy to
determine. Viewing the situation ex ante, therefore, we should expect to
find that property rights are exchanged or modified by voluntary agreement rather than by self-help. When we consider the situation ex post,
however, it is clear that something has gone wrong. For some reason,
perhaps a unilateral or mutual mistake of fact, or negligence or indifference on the part of the TO, we are faced with what is in effect a situation
of "market failure." At the very least, we know that the AP has for some
time been enjoying rights which ordinarily can be acquired only by
purchase, and yet no exchange or modification of property rights has
taken place. Thus, it would seem that the general rationale for applying
a mechanical rule here-to faciliate market exchange between the TO
and persons in the position of the AP-no longer carries much, if any,
force.
Nevertheless, the fact that we have uncovered an instance of "market failure" does not mean that we should rush to employ a judgmental
entitlement determination rule. Although there may be little hope of a
negotiated exchange between AP and TO, this does not mean that the
property will not be subject to market transactions in the future-in particular, voluntary exchanges between AP and his successors. Similarly, it
does not mean that interested third parties-creditors, contractors and
the like-will not deal with the property in the expectation that AP is the
true owner. Use of a mechancial entitlement determination rule in settling the assignment of entitlements between AP and TO may be of considerable value in facilitating these future exchanges, and in inducing
various third parties to rely on apparent ownership as a probable indicator of title.
To illustrate these concerns, consider again the example of the AP
who decides to build an addition on what turns out to be TO's property.
Assume that the TO sleeps on his rights, the statute of limitations runs,
and now AP wants to sell the property to API. Application of a mechanical rule in settling the question of entitlement between AP and TO will
have significant advantages in this context. Suppose that AP has obtained a survey in conjunction with his proposed purchase (which is customary in most jurisdictions),5 8 and the survey reveals that TO rather
than AP is the title owner of the land. If API's attorney can nevertheless
advise that AP owns the property by adverse possession, then AP
the high costs of making these kind of identifications with respect to chattels undoubtedly explains
why today theft of chattels is a major social problem, whereas disseisin of land is not.
58 A. AXELROD, C. BuRGER & Q. JoHNsroN, LAND TRANsFER AND INANCE 369 (1974).
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should be willing to go through with the transaction. In fact, if AP's
entitlement was crystal clear, API's lender and title insurance company
might not even demand that AP or AP obtain a judgment showing title
by adverse possession. Moreover, even if they did demand a judgment,5 9
it probably could be obtained by default or stipulation, since TO's lawyer
would advise him that his interest in the land has been extinguished and
TO would not want to incur needless litigation expenses by contesting
the issue.
On the other hand, if API's attorney must advise that AP's entitlement is uncertain and requires a judge and jury to apply a judgmental
entitlement determination rule, then AP I may not be willing or able to go
through with the transaction. Almost certainly, API's lender and title
insurance company will insist that AP obtain a judgment showing title by
adverse possession. However, it will be difficult for AP to obtain such a
judgment by default or stipulation, since the discretionary nature ofjudgmental rules makes it hard for the parties to predict how the court will
award the entitlement, and the possibility of appropriating substantial
rents from a favorable judgment may make it hard to induce the TO to
settle. 6° Consequently, the parties may have to litigate the issue of title,
and, given the judgmental nature of the rule, the litigation may be
costly. 61 Ultimately, the uncertainty and cost associated with ajudgmental rule may defeat the transaction. In this fashion, the use of judgmental
entitlement determination rules operates as a restraint on the alienation
of property.
But even if mechanical rules are desirable after the statute runs as
well as before, is it possible to formulate a mechanical rule in this context? To answer this question it is necessary to consider what sorts of
functions an entitlement determination rule must perform. The four basic rationales for the institution of adverse possession surveyed in Part I
suggest that an entitlement determination rule has to perform at least
two functions: (1) it must assure the passage of a significant period of
time between the original dispossession and the shift in entitlement; and
(2) it must assure adequate notice to the TO and interested third parties
of AP's claim of entitlement.
All four of the traditional rationales for adverse possession suggest
that the entitlement should be transferred to the AP only after the AP
59 As suggested earlier, a judgment would be helpful in eliminating the need to reestablish continually the AP's entitlement upon subsequent transfers of the property. See supra note 41.
60 Default is unlikely because the Supreme Court has held that due process requires reasonable
and appropriate efforts to insure that the title holder has actual notice of a quiet title action. See
Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306 (1950). Such notice will apprise the title holder of the potential for appropriating
economic rents, making it likely that he will appear and defend the suit.
61 In theory, it would be rational for the plaintiff and defendant to settle the case by dividing the
appropriable rents and saving attorneys' fees, but given uncertain entitlements, such behavior cannot
be guaranteed. See Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982).
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has been in possession for a significant period of time. It takes time for
evidence to get lost and for remote claims to pile up which might impair
the marketability of property. Moreover, a significant period of time
must elapse before the TO has unreasonably slept on his rights and the
AP and interested third parties have developed strong reliance interests
related to the property. In principle, of course, a judgmental entitlement
determination rule could accomodate these concerns. Thus, courts could
consider, on a case-by-case basis, the likelihood that evidence has been
lost or destroyed or that ancient claims will impair the marketability of
the property. The courts could also inquire directly into the reasonableness of the TO's delay and the strength of the various reliance interests.
After weighing all these factors, the court could then decide whether to
award the entitlement to the AP or to the TO.
In practice, however, these considerations have been reflected in
what may be the most extreme of mechanical entitlement determination
rules: the legislature selects a fixed number of years, set forth in the statute of limitations, after which we conclusively presume that evidence will
be lost, remote claims will impair marketability, the TO has unreasonably slept on his rights, and the AP and others will have developed strong
expectations of AP's continued possession. The rule is undoubtedly arbitrary-the period of limitation ranges from 5 to 20 or more years, depending on the predilections of the legislators of the jurisdiction 62 and
undoubtedly some TO's have lost their property even though they could
have shown, had they been allowed, that the underlying rationales for a
system of adverse possession do not apply. Yet the attractive features of
selecting an arbitrary number of years should be apparent. Allowing the
TO to attempt to prove the underlying factors on a case-by-case basis
would be time-consuming and would yield unpredictable results. Consequently, litigation would become far more frequent and costly. The universal practice of using an arbitrary number of years as a proxy for lost
evidence, dilatoriness on the part of the TO, etc., is thus a testament to
the desirability of mechanical entitlement determination rules in this
context.
In addition to the passage of time, it is also necessary to insure that
the TO and others have had adequate notice of AP's claim of entitlement. In part, this is simply a reflection of the fact that adverse possession is based on the statute of limitations. 63 In order for the statute of
limitations to expire, there must be some point at which the TO's cause
of action accrues, and it makes sense that this should be a point when a
reasonably diligent TO would be on notice of a rival claim. The notice
requirement can also be explained in terms of the sleeping owner rationale. It would be unreasonable to punish the TO for failing to assert his
62 See Taylor, Titles To Land By Adverse Possession,supra note 1, at 554.
63 See Walsh, supra note 1, at 545-55.

1141

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

right to exclude unless he has some reason to know that someone is contesting his rights. Finally, notice to the world is necessary before we can
talk about possible reliance interests of third parties.
Again, the notice requirement could be accomodated by a judgmental rule. We could ask, on a case-by-case basis, whether the TO (or
others) subjectively knew or, perhaps, as a prudent owner, should have
known, of AP's claim of entitlement. In practice, however, the common
law has adopted a series of relatively objective criteria that single out
forms of behavior by which AP's are likely to provide notice to the TO
and the world at large. 64 Most clearly, the requirement that the AP's
possession of the property be "open and notorious" demands a certain
form of behavior likely to put others on notice. In addition, however, the
requirements that the possession be "actual," "continuous," and "exclusive" also function to delineate forms of behavior likely to alert the world
to AP's claim to the property. Finally, even the requirement that the
possession be "hostile under claim of right" performs a notice function,
at least under the "objective" interpretation of this element favored by
most cases and the commentators. So interpreted, this requirement simply eliminates those claimants-such as tenants or licensees-who have
had possession of the property with the actual or implied permission of
the TO-permission that would lull the TO into thinking that the AP's
claim is not truly adverse and negate any presumption by others that AP
is the true owner.
Again, these various common law elements are only proxies for notice. Consequently, they will deprive some TO's of property where they
might be able to prove that they had no forewarning of the AP's possession. But the unpredictability and cost of inquiring into whether the TO
and others had notice-in-fact would undoubtedly exceed that of making
the objective behavioral inquiries demanded by the common law. Thus,
the common law doctrine again can be seen as a testament to the desirability of mechanical rules, although admittedly in a less dramatic fashion
65
than in the case of the statute of limitations.
In short, if we ignore the problem of the bad faith AP, the law of
adverse possession could operate-and in fact it tries to operatethrough a relatively mechanical entitlement determination rule. To be
sure, the common law test is rather complex, and some of the factors,
such as the requirement that the possession be adverse under a claim of
64 For commentary recognizing the connection between the common law test for adverse possession and notice see Rose, Possessionas the Origin ofProperty, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 73 (1985); Sternberg, supra note 1, at 208-09; Walsh, supra note 1, at 542.
65 The five common law elements can also be viewed as a proxy for the strength of the AP's
reliance interest. Possession which is actual, open and notorious, exclusive, continuous and hostile
under a claim of right generally will conform to a pattern of behavior which is characteristic of one
who is a true owner. Persons who behave like a TO will presumably harbor expectations characteristic of a TO.
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right, must be carefully defined in such a way (absence of permission
from the TO) that they retain a hard-edged quality. But all in all, the law
of adverse possession appears on its face to constitute a rather remarkable achievement: a doctrine that serves a number of distinct yet complimentary functions and does so under a decisional rule which is
sufficiently mechanical that it will not unduly interfere with a functioning
market in property rights.
If, however, we decide to take into account the competing concern
with deterring coerced transfers of property, then the possibility of using
a mechanical rule to fix the assignment of entitlements starts to disappear. Obviously, if we required courts to inquire directly into the subjective state of mind of the AP, the costs of the rule would rise dramatically.
The kinds of fact-finding and inference-drawing necessary to establish
the AP's subjective state of mind necessarily would make the rule highly
judgmental. On the other hand, it is difficult to think of any objective
behavioral test that could serve as a satisfactory proxy for subjective
good faith. One possibility found in many jurisdictions is "color of title"-a requirement that the AP enter the property pursuant to a deed or
66
other presumptive evidence of title which later turns out to be invalid.
However, although entry under color of title typically represents a case
of good faith, it does not begin to exhaust the possible circumstances of
good faith dispossession. The typical case of mistaken boundaries, for
example, is one of good faith, but generally does not satisfy the color of
title requirement. Absent some more general behavioral proxy for good
faith, analogous to the open and notorious proxy for notice, the law faces
an unhappy dilemma. It can either jettison the relatively mechanical test
for establishing adverse possession-the statute of limitations plus the
traditional common law elements-and adopt a judgmental test that includes some consideration of subjective intent or it must ignore the reasons for differentiating between those who enter in good faith and those
who enter in bad faith.
Without discussing the problem, legal commentators have generally
opted for the latter course. With virtual unanimity, they insist that the
law ignore the distinction between the good faith and bad faith possessor,
however anomolous this might be in light of the general practice of the
law.67 Professor Helmholz reveals, however, that although the courts
have usually followed the commentators in the formulation of applicable
66 See generally Taylor, Titles to Land by Adverse Possession,supranote 1, at 554. For representative statutes and case law construing the meaning of "color of title," see CAL. CODE § 324 (West
1982); Safwenberg v. Marquez, 50 Cal. App. 3d 301, 123 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1975) (adverse possession
under color of title is founded upon a written instrument or judgment or decree which purports to
convey title but is somehow defective); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-67-22 (Law. Co-op. 1976); Mullis v.

Winchester, 237 S.C. 487, 118 S.E.2d 61 (1961) (color of title means any semblance of title by which
the possession may be ascertained).
67 See supra note 4.
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doctrine, they have rebelled when it comes to applying that doctrine. In
effect, they have transformed what appears to be a relatively mechanical
entitlement determination rule into a judgmental rule.
Without doubt, the primary vehicle for this transformation has been
'68
the requirement that the possession be "hostile under claim of right.
Although the commentators have insisted that claim of right means no
more than that the possession be without express or implied permission,
judicial application of this element is less secure, sometimes tending toward an objective standard of no permission, sometimes toward a subjective standard of good faith, sometimes, remarkably enough, toward a
subjective standard of badfaith.69 No doubt in most jurisdictions there is
enough ambiguity in the explication of this element that judges-or
counsel arguing to a jury-can shade the meaning in one direction or
another based on the facts of the case.
The other elements of adverse possession, however, also provide opportunities for manipulation. For example, the requirement of "continuous" possession seems to reflect a fairly mechanical standard. Yet in
cases of bad faith, judges and juries can seize on the AP's absence for a
few days as grounds for denying title by adverse possession, 70 whereas in
cases of good faith, they can excuse repeated absences of months at a
time. 71 In this fashion, a rule which appears to be capable of quieting
title to property rather quickly and efficiently has been transformed into
72
a font of litigation.
There appears to be no easy solution to the dilemma, at least at the
stage of assignment of entitlements. We could of course insist that subjective good faith be expressly recognized as a factor in establishing title
by adverse possession. This would make the law more principled than it
is now. But the added costs of doing so would be formidable. In cases
which rather clearly involve good faith-faulty deeds, surveying errors,
and the like-the additional requirement would increase the uncertainty
and costs of establishing title by adverse possession, with little corresponding benefit. Moreover, even in cases of bad faith possession, it appears that courts implicitly "balance" the need to punish or deter coerced
transfers against other factors, such as the length of time that has passed,
the degree of negligence on the part of the TO, and the strength of the
68 Helmholz, supra note 3, at 342-43.
69 The most notorious example is the so-called "Maine rule" with respect to boundary disputes,
which requires a subjective belief that the occupied property belongs to someone else. See Preble v.
Maine Cent. R.R., 85 Me. 260, 27 A. 149 (1893). There is a general consensus that this rule is
rapidly dying out. See Mannillo v. Gorski, 54 N.J. 378, 255 A.2d 258 (1969) (overruling "Maine
rule" in New Jersey).
70 Eg., Mendonca v. Cities Service Oil Co., 354 Mass. 323, 237 N.E.2d 16 (1968).
71 Eg., Howard v. Kunto, 3 Wash. App. 393, 477 P.2d 210 (1970).
72 Helmholz notes: "The relevant cases are abundant. In fact they are over-abundant. Many of
them involve relatively insignificant pieces of land, backyard boundary disputes being depressingly
common." Helmholz, supra note 3, at 333.
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reliance interests of the AP and others.73 So the new, "principled" rule
would have to include a balancing element as well as an inquiry into
subjective good faith, making the costs and uncertainty even greater. In
short, attempting to accommodate the interest in punishing or deterring
coerced transfers presents no happy options at the stage of deciding who
should get the entitlement. Perhaps if we turn to the question of remedies we can discover some way out of the dilemma in which the law of
adverse possession appears to be mired.
III.

ADVERSE POSSESSION AND LIABLITY RULES

We come at last to the issue reflected in the title of this essay-the
choice of remedies to implement the system of adverse possession. As
noted earlier, adverse possession heretofore has operated as a system of
property rules. 74 In this section, I would like to consider what would
75
happen if, as suggested by the California Court of Appeal in Warsaw,
courts applied a liability rule in the period after the lapse of the statute of
limitations. Specifically, I would like to ask what would happen if the
expiration of the statute of limitations and the satisfaction of the common law test for adverse possession simply transformed the TO's entitlement from one protected by a property rule into one protected by a
liability rule, requiring the AP to pay the TO the fair market value of the
property in order to retain possession and obtain a new title.
To facilitate discussion, it will help to consider at the outset how
such a system might operate. I will assume that the transformation
would be effected along the lines suggested by Warsaw, through judicial
recognition of an independent action by the TO for indemnification. 7 6 In
other words, if the TO sued for possession and the AP successfully interposed a defense of adverse possession, then the TO would be allowed to
assert an independent claim against the AP for indemnification. Alternatively, if the AP filed a quiet title action and successfully showed that he
had satisfied the elements of adverse possession, then the TO could counterclaim with an action for indemnification. I will examine two different
73 Id. at 347-48.
74 See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
75 139 Cal. App. 3d 260, 188 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1983) vacated, 35 Cal. 3d 564, 676 P.2d 584, 199

Cal. Rptr. 773 (1984); see supra text accompanying notes 10-14.
76 See Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 128 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972) (ex-

pressly referring to such a plaintiff-payment requirement as "indemnification"). Whether it is legitimate for the judiciary to adopt an indemnification requirement, as opposed to leaving any such
modification to the legislature, is beyond the scope of this paper. A majority of the California
Supreme Court justices in Warsaw felt that, at least under the California statutes codifying the common law principles of prescription, adoption of an indemnification requirement would have to await
legislative action. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13. My own view would be that since the
California statutes were a codification of commmon law rules, the legislature probably did not intend
to preclude further common law development. See Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal
Courts, 52 U. Cm. L. REV. 1 (1985).
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versions of the indemnification proposal: "universal indemnification,"
which would apply in all cases of adverse possession without regard to
the mental state of the AP, and "limited indemnification," which would
apply only in cases in which the AP acquired the property in bad faith.
Implementing the liability rule by means of an action for indemnification helps to eliminate several possible objections to the proposal.
First, since the TO must appear and fie the indemnification action
(either in conjunction with his action for possession or by counterclaim
to the AP's quiet title action), the system of adverse possession would not
break down if the TO cannot be found or otherwise defaults. In such
cases, the AP would acquire the property without paying just as he does
now.77 Second, requiring the TO to assert a claim for indemnification
when he files the action to regain possession, or as a counterclaim to the
AP's quiet title action, would eliminate a possible source of uncertainty
for the AP. The AP would know within the limitations period for an
action for indemnification or immediately upon judgment (if the jurisdiction views the action as a compulsory counterclaim) whether he must
pay to remain in possession of the property. Finally, casting the liability
rule in the form of an action for indemnification would put the burden of
persuasion on the TO. Under either version of the proposal, the TO
would bear the burden of establishing the fair market value of the property. Moreover, under a system of limited indemnification, the TO
would bear the burden of showing that the AP entered the property in
bad faith. Consequently, the AP would not have the onerous task of
proving a negative-his lack of knowledge of the TO's paramount title.
The most obvious cost of either universal or limited indemnification
is that it would add to the expense of litigating adverse possession cases.
Under a system of universal indemnification, the parties (or at least the
TO) would have to submit evidence of the market value of the property,
something which is not required now. Under a system of limited indemnification, the parties (or at least the TO) would in addition have to present evidence of the AP's subjective mental state at the time of
dispossession-an historical fact that might be very difficult to establish,
and again something not required now. But these added administrative
costs and uncertainties are only a small part of the picture. More importantly, the indemnification proposal would have serious implications for
the general policies previously identified as underlying the system of adverse possession.
First, indemnification would frustrate the objective of eliminating
claims involving lost or destroyed evidence. Under either version, the
proposal requires that the parties submit evidence of the value of the
property. There are several different points in time which conceivably
77 This would be the case unless, perhaps, we adopted a system of civil fines or escheat for cases

in which the TO defaults or cannot otherwise be discovered.
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could be selected for valuing the property: the date of AP's original entry (when the statute of limitations starts to run); the date on which the
statute of limitations expires (when the AP's right to title accrues); or the
date of judgment (when the AP obtains title-in-fact). Whatever else may
be said about the choice between these different measuring points, 78 existing case law suggests that the date of the AP's original entry is the
appropriate time for valuation. Under current doctrine, when the AP
acquires title by adverse possession, his title is deemed to "relate back" to
the date of original entry. 79 Since the AP is considered to have "owned"
the property from the date of original entry, any action by the TO for
mesne profits or for improvements made after this date is cut off, even if
the statute of limitations on these actions has not expired. By parity of
reasoning, application of a liability rule should award the TO the fair
market value of the property as it stood at the time of AP's original entry, saving the value of any improvements and capital appreciation after
this time (above the rate of prejudgment interest) to the AP.8 0 As should
be clear, however, if we select the date of original entry as the time for
valuation of the property, this will present a potential problem of lost
evidence.
Under a system of limited indemnification, another troubling evidentiary issue arises: the need to prove the AP's state of mind at the time
of original dispossession. Since dispossession is necessarily an event
which occurred at least as long ago as the term of the statute of limitations, the limited indemnification proposal is also clearly inconsistent
with the lost-evidence rationale. To be sure, the fact that the TO has the
burden of persuasion to show that the AP entered in bad faith alleviates
the potential for unfairness to the AP here. If evidence of the AP's state
of mind is lost or inconclusive, then the TO will fail to discharge this
burden and the AP will get the property without paying-the situation as
it exists today. Moreover, in most cases the AP should be in as good or
better position than the TO to rebut or offer alternative interpretations of
such evidence of the AP's past mental state as exists. 81
78 1 argue below that there are other good reasons for selecting the time of original entry as the
relevant date for determining value. See infta text accompanying notes 79-92.
79 See Henderson v. First National Bank of De Witt, 254 Ark. 427, 494 S.W.2d 452 (1973);
Burket v. Krimlofski, 167 Neb. 45, 91 N.W.2d 57 (1958); Counce v. Yount-Lee Oil Co., 87 F.2d 572

(5th Cir. 1937).
80 Since the object of a liability rule is to put the TO in roughly the same position he would have
been had the AP agreed to purchase the property at the time of original dispossession, the TO should
also be awarded prejudgment interest on the indemnification award running from the date of original
dispossession to the date ofjudgment. This is analogous to the award of prejudgment interest where
the defendant has been found to have wrongfully withheld payment from the plaintiff in the past.
See Southern Pacific Trans. Co. v. San Antonio, Texas, 748 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1984).
81 Nevertheless, because of the very real possibility that the AP will be deprived of documents or
witnesses that might otherwise disprove a claim of bad faith, perhaps a court adopting a limited
indemnification system would want to consider as an additional safeguard a heightened burden of
persuasion, such as proof by clear and convincing evidence. This higher standard of proof is gener-

1147

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Furthermore, under a system of limited indemnification, the TO's
action should run only against the original AP who entered in bad faith,
not against subsequent purchasers for value or other good faith API's
who are allowed to "tack" their possession onto that of the original AP.
This would avoid the unfairness of requiring a good faith possessor to
disprove an allegation that some other possessor acted in bad faith at a
point in the distant past.
Indemnification would also interfere with the quieting-title function
of adverse possession. Under universal indemnification, every TO would
be entitled to indemnification upon entry of a judgment in favor of an
AP. In effect, quiet-title actions would become condemnation proceedings, with holders of remote and fractional claims lining up to receive
their "just compensation." Of course, effective notice to the successors of
some remote interest holders would be impossible, and these claims
would go by default. But most remote holders who received actual notice would probably assert a claim for indemnification-it would be like a
legacy from a long-lost uncle. Consequently, securing title by adverse
possession would become much more expensive. Recognizing this fact,
title insurance companies would raise their premiums. The net result
would be an additional drag on the market in property rights.
Note that limited indemnification would interfere with the quietingtitle function much less than would universal indemnification. Only a
fraction of adverse possession cases involve bad faith dispossession,8 2 and
thus only a fraction would require indemnification of the TO. Under
limited indemnification, therefore, the aggregate costs of quieting title
83
would rise, but not by as much as under universal indemnification.
Furthermore, indemnification would interfere with the sleepingowner rationale. Universal indemnification would reduce the TO's incentive to assert his right to exclude. Under a regime of property rules,
the sanction for failing to assert the right to exclude is forfeiture of the
property-a fairly powerful deterrent to indifferent custodial practices.
With universal indemnification, however, the only sanction would be
conversion of an entitlement protected by a property rule into one protected by a liability rule. In other words, the TO would lose the right to
the "thing" in question, but would receive its cash value as of the date of
entry instead. Given that in many cases the TO who has been less than
fully vigilant is an absentee owner who holds the property for investment
purposes only, this would be no sanction at all except to the extent that
the property has appreciated in value. Consequently, absentee owners
ally required in civil fraud cases, where proof of historical knowledge (in this case, of materially false

misrepresentations) is also at issue. See 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2498 (3d ed. 1949).
82 See Helmholz, supra note 3, at 335, 338. Unfortunately, Helmholz does not provide an estimate of what percentage of adverse possession cases involve bad faith.
83 In cases where the current possessor entered in good faith, they would not rise at all, except to
the extent that administrative costs would be marginally higher.
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would be less likely to assert their right to exclude, and there would be a
marginal shift away from the use of the market for the transfer of property rights.
Limited indemnification would also reduce the incentives for good
custodial practices, but to a much lesser extent than universal indemnification would. Since bad faith dispossession is only a subset of adverse
possession cases, TO's could not count on indemnification upon failing to
assert their right to exclude. Thus, under the limited form of the proposal, there would still be a signficant incentive for the TO periodically to
inspect the property and remove encroachments and intruders, and less
of a shift away from market transactions toward self-help.
Finally, the indemnification proposal would substantially undermine
long-term reliance interests of AP's and interested third parties. Universal indemnification would amount to imposing a one-time tax on the AP
equal to 100% of fair market value as of the date of original entry. The
AP would be put to the choice of paying this enormous tax or losing the
property. No doubt many AP's would pay, but in paying they would
lose everything except the value of improvements, any appreciation in
market value since the date of original entry above the rate of prejudgment interest, and the subjective "premium" which they attach to their
holding. 84 Clearly, if we selected some date other than that of original
entry for valuation of the property, the exaction would be an even higher
percentage of total value. But the interference with the AP's expectation
interest is only a small part of the problem. More serious would be the
frustration of justifiable reliance by third persons if the AP's unwillingness or inability to pay this huge tax resulted in forfeiture of the property
to the TO.
Limited indemnification would also tax away much of value of the
property, but only in cases where the TO could show that the AP acquired the property in bad faith. Since the bad faith possessor is probably someone to whom we are less sympathetic in the first place, the
frustration of expectations here is considerably less troubling, although
admittedly the interference with third party reliance if the AP refused to
pay would remain a problem.
In sum, the costs of the indemnification proposal are substantial.
The California Supreme Court may have overstated the case when it said
that "[t]o exact such a charge would entirely defeat the legitimate policies underlying the doctrines of adverse possession and prescription
.... ,"85 But it seems fairly clear that at least the universal indemnification proposal would go a long way toward undermining the system of
adverse possession. Limited indemnification is, in at least one respect,
84 Most property owners value their property higher than the market does because of the costs of
relocation, if not for more sentimental reasons. See generally, Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning:
Covenans, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Cm. L. Rv. 681 (1973).
85 35 Cal. 3d 564, 570, 676 P.2d 584, 590, 199 Cal. Rptr. 773, 779 (1984).
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worse than universal indemnification; it would present a new and troubling problem in lost evidence in allowing the TO to attempt to prove that
the AP acquired the property in bad faith. Otherwise, however, the costs
of limited indemnification would be significantly lower than those of universal indemnification. In particular, the quieting-title, sleeping owner,
and reliance functions would be diminished, but not irreparably damaged, under the limited indemnification proposal.
Despite these substantial costs, three general benefits have been or
can be asserted to follow from indemnification: (1) fairness to the TO;
(2) promotion of the most efficient use of the land; and (3) deterrence of
coerced transfers of property.
In Warsaw, both the California Court of Appeal and the dissenting
and concurring justices in the California Supreme Court suggested that
indemnification was necessary in order to insure fair treatment of the
TO. Recall that in Warsaw, the TO refused the AP's offer to purchase an
easement, but the AP's trucks persisted in driving on and off the property
anyway. Moreover, the TO was apparently not indifferent to its property, but merely waiting for a more propitious time for development.
Justice Reynoso asserted that in these circumstances, the law of adverse
possession or prescription requires an innocent TO to file a suit for trespass or risk losing all right to the property.8 6 He implied that it is unfair
to put a TO to such a burden, and that at the very least the law should
allow indemnification when the property right is taken away.
But Justice Reynoso clearly exaggerated the burden placed on the
TO to preserve his property rights. In most cases, the TO will not need
to fie suit to preserve his right to exclude-he can do so merely by calling the police or erecting a temporary fence. This could, of course, elicit
a lawsuit by the A.P, which the TO would have to defend. But since the
TO's right to exclude is protected by a mechanical entitlement determination rule, the AP's chance of prevailing in such a suit (before the statute of limitations runs) is negligible. Most likely, therefore, the AP faced
with a police inquiry or a fence would either desist from trespassing or
submit an offer to purchase.
Moreover, Warsaw is something of an unusual case in that the TO
was aware of the intrusion and was more or less actively planning to
make use of the property in the future. In most adverse possession cases,
the TO is oblivious to the adverse use and has been completely out of
possession for the full period of the statute of limitations. 87 In these
more typical cases, it is hard to feel that the transfer of the property to
the AP will defeat some important reliance interest of the TO. In most
cases, the TO's interest in seeking to eject the AP probably is just a desire
86 35 Cal. 3d at 574, 676 P.2d at 593, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 783 (Reynoso, J., dissenting).

87 This follows from the exclusivity and continuity requirements of the traditional five-part
standard.
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to obtain economic rents; it is the AP (or interested third parties) who
can claim reliance based on AP's active use and occupation. Thus, fairness to the TO is at most a feeble reason for adopting a liability rule.
A student commentator has recently argued in the pages of this Review that the result reached by the court of appeal in Warsaw can be
justified not only on fairness but also on efficiency grounds. 88 Drawing
an analogy to the use of liability rules in nuisance disputes, 89 the commentator argues that a liability rule assures that the property will end up
in the hands of the party who can exact the most value from it. If the AP
values the property more highly than the market, he will pay the TO to
keep it; if AP does not value the property more highly than the market,
he will refuse to pay and the property will revert to the TO.
The analogy to nuisance disputes is misplaced, however, because
there is no impediment to market exchange here. 90 Certainly, afterjudgment has been rendered (if not before), we are dealing with a low transaction cost situation-the number of disputants is undoubtedly small, the
costs of drafting and enforcing a contract are manageable, and the identity of the owner and the scope of the affected rights have been clearly
established by the judgment. Consequently, the Coase Theorem tells us
that the property should end up in the hands of the party who can exact
the most value from it, no matter who is awarded the entitlement, and no
matter whether it is protected by a property rule or a liability rule.
For example, suppose we follow the ordinary rules of adverse possession and award the property to the AP protected by a property rule.
If the TO (or anyone else) values it more highly than the AP, he can buy
it from the AP, thus assuring that it ends up in its most productive use.
Or, suppose we give the entitlement to the AP protected by a liability
rule. If the TO values the property more than the market, he will pay the
AP the fair market value; alternatively, if the AP values it even more
than the TO, then he will pay the TO a premium above its market value
in order to buy it back. The point is that in a situation of low transaction
costs, any combination of entitlements and remedies to protect those entitlements should achieve the value-maximizing result. Thus, indemnification cannot be justified, at least directly, on allocational efficiency
91
grounds.
88 Comment, Compensationfor the Involuntary TransferofPropertyBetween Private Partie"Application of a Liability Rule to the Law ofAdverse Possession, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 759 (1984).
89 Id. at 766-72. See also Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E. 2d 870, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970); Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700
(1972).
90 Not all nuisance disputes entail high transaction costs, but the use of liability rules has generally been urged on the assumption that they do. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1119;
Merrill, supra note 49.
91 The commentator repeatedly cites Professor Coase's seminal article, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 ".LAW & ECON. 1 (1960), but argues that it has no bearing on the efficiency argument
because high transaction costs prevent exchange between the AP and the TO, making courts a more
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The only asserted benefit of a liability rule with any degree of plausibility, in my view, is that it will help punish or deter coerced transfers of
property. As discussed in Part 1,92 awarding the property to the AP after
the statute of limitations runs increases the incentives of AP's to dispossess other persons of their property. As previously discussed, the concern about innocent or negligent dispossession is a relatively weak one.
At least, it does not seem that the judges and juries rate it more highly
than the systemic justifications which underlie the system of adverse possession. Intentional dispossession, however, is of greater concern. There
are sound reasons for treating intentional dispossession as potentially a
more serious social problem, both from a moral and an economic point
of view, and judges and juries seem to share this intuition.
In Parts I and II, I suggested that courts manipulate the common
law doctrine of adverse possession in order to punish or deter those who
intentionally dispossess others of their property. A less drastic means of
achieving a similar end would be to apply a liability rule in cases of bad
faith possession. A rule of limited indemnification would in effect impose
a fine on bad faith dispossessors equal to the value of the property at the
time of original entry. Squatters and thieves would know that, even if
they could obtain title to property after the passage of the statute of limitations and the satisfaction of the common law's five elements, they
would have to pay for their gain. Consequently, the incentives to engage
in coerced transfers would be reduced.
There are several advantages to reflecting our disapproval of the bad
faith possessor at the stage of remedy rather than entitlement. First, in
cases where the TO has disappeared or the dispossession occurred so
long ago that evidence of the mental state of the possessor has been lost
or forgotten, an action for indemnification would simply fail, leaving the
main purposes of the system of adverse possession intact. 93 Conversely,
if subjective bad faith were an express requirement for obtaining title by
adverse possession, the difficulties of proof associated with this element
efficient agency for the allocation of resources. See Comment, supra note 88, at 769. But even if it
were plausible to assert that there are barriers to exchange before the statute of limitations runs
(perhaps because of difficulty in locating the TO or because the AP has made improvements which
give rise to strategic bargaining), this does not mean that there would be similar impediments after
entry of a judgment transferring the entitlement to the AP protected by a property rule. The judgment should reduce information costs about entitlements to zero, and it is unlikely that the TO,
having been out of possession for the period of the statute, will have sunk costs which would give rise
to strategic bargaining. In asserting that courts are more efficient in allocating resources than the
market, see id. at 770, the conmnentator also fails to count the higher administrative costs associated
with a liability rule as a social cost although clearly from an efficiency perspective these costs are just

as "real" as are transaction costs.
92 See supra text accompanying notes 42-48.
93 Presumably the action for indeminification would itself be subject to a statute of limitations.
If the indemnification action accrues upon the entry of judgment, this means that the failure of the
TO to appear within the period of limitations on the indemnification action would give the AP the
property without any further liability for damages.

1152

79:1122 (1984-1985)

Adverse Possession

could interfere measurably with the functions of adverse possession. 94
Second, by limiting the issue of subjective intent to the remedial
stage, we would strengthen the extent to which AP's and interested third
parties could rely on an AP's continued possession of the property. Consider the case, probably not that unusual, where the AP has some inkling
that the title rests in someone else-in other words, where the evidence of
bad faith is ambiguous-and yet the TO has not filed an action to regain
possession. If the subjective intent of the AP were a relevant issue at the
stage of entitlement, then the AP would face considerable uncertainty. If
he should go ahead and improve or develop the property, he could have
his entire interest wiped out by a subequent action by the TO for possession. 95 However, if the issue of subjective intent were relevant only to the
question of remedy, the worst that could happen in this situation would
be that the AP would have to pay the fair market value as of the date of
original entry (plus prejudgment interest). This should encourage AP's
to improve and develop the property, safe in the knowledge that they
would be assured at least continued possession of the property and the
value of the improvements. In addition, interested third parties (who do
not know whether the AP acquired the property in good faith or bad
faith) should have greater confidence that the AP will remain in
possession.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, if courts knew that the bad
faith possessor would be faced with an action for indemnification, they
might not feel compelled to manipulate the traditional common law doctrine in order to "punish" those who acquired the property in bad faith,
and "reward" those who acquired it innocently. Adoption of the limited
indemnification requirement would permit the basic entitlement determination rule to take on a more mechanical cast, reducing the need for
litigation to establish title by adverse possession, at least in cases where
the TO has disappeared or there is no question that the AP acted in good
faith. Admittedly, there is an element of speculation here. But it stands
to reason that judges and juries would be much more willing to apply a
mechanical rule at the stage of entitlement if they knew that there was a
way of "doing justice" at the stage of remedy. Certainly, it is hard to
imagine that this reform would produce greater uncertainty than exists
today, when the official doctrine says one thing and the results reached
by the courts say another.
94 Admittedly, one could try to achieve the same effect at the entitlement stage by making the
bad faith of the AP a relevant factor only if the TO appeared and carried the burden of persuasion on
this issue. But jury confusion would be less likely if the issue arose only in what would technically be
a separate action for indemnification, rather than as an integral part of the case on the merits.
95 I assume here the application of the common law rule denying the trespasser any recovery for
the value of improvements made to the land. See Merryman, Improving the Lot of the Trespassing
Improver, 11 STAN. L. REV. 456, 465-66 (1959). With respect to personal property, the value of
improvements may be recoverable if the doctrine of accession applies.
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Faced with a particularly blatant case of bad faith possession, a
court once declared: "This idea of acquiring title by larceny does not go
in this country. A man must have a bona fide claim, or believe in his own
mind that he has got a right as owner, when he goes upon land that does
not belong to him, in order to acquire title by occupation and possession."' 96 Professor Helmholz shows that this statement, although subsequently derided by commentators as a deviant or minority view, 97
accurately reflects the sentiments of the judges and juries who decide
adverse possession cases.
Before reading Professor Helmholz' study, I probably would have
rejected out of hand the idea of applying liability rules in adverse possession cases. Certainly, requiring every AP to indemnify the TO would
seriously undermine the institution of adverse possession. But Helmholz'
findings suggest that a right of indemnification limited to cases of bad
faith dispossession may make sense on a kind of "theory of the second
best." As things presently stand, the law insists that subjective intent
does not matter, but then permits the rules of adverse possession to be
manipulated so that it does. The result is unpredictability and a steady
stream of litigation. A right of limited indemnification would interfere to
some extent with the policies of adverse possession, but it might also
render the doctrine more principled and predictable, and hence reduce
the volume of litigation. Given that judges and juries insist on taking
subjective intent into account, and given that there is some justification
for their doing so, it may be better to implement a system of limited
indemnification than to persist along the present path.

96 Jasperson v. Scharnikow, 150 F. 571, 572 (9th Cir. 1907).
97 See Helmholz, supra note 3, at 342. See also R. CUNNIGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHrrMAN, supra note 7, at 761 (characterizing Jasperson as an "extreme view").
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